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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Shan Wang 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Accounting 
 
June 2015 
 
Title: Top Management Team Functional Diversity and Management Forecast Accuracy 
 
 
          Prior literature documents that the diversity of top management team (TMT) 
functional experiences enhances firm performance through its effect on information 
processing and sharing between team members. In this study, I examine whether TMT 
functional diversity affects management forecast accuracy via the information 
aggregation and communication among top executives. If functional diversity among 
individuals allows top executives to better process and share information, a greater 
degree of functional diversity should lead to more accurate management forecasts. TMT 
functional diversity can take two forms. The first, between-member functional diversity, 
refers to the heterogeneity in the primary functional domains of each TMT member, and 
the second, within-member functional diversity, refers to the average intrapersonal 
breadth of functional experiences of each TMT. I find that both types are positively 
associated with management forecast accuracy. In cross-sectional analyses, I find that the 
effect of TMT functional diversity is more important for firms with greater uncertainty 
and complexity and for firms that are led by CEOs and CFOs who are narrow functional 
specialists. Collectively, the results suggest that TMT functional diversity plays an 
important role in management disclosure, thereby shedding light on how the knowledge 
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composition of top management influences the aggregation and communication of 
financial information. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
A key question of interest to accounting researchers lies in understanding the 
factors that influence the quality of public firm disclosures. Prior literature documents 
various economic determinants of disclosure quality such as earnings uncertainty and 
corporate governance (e.g., Ajinkya, Bhojraj, & Sengupta, 2005; Karamanou & Vafeas, 
2005). Recent research in this area finds that “human elements”, i.e., top management, 
also explain a significant proportion of cross-sectional variation in the quality of 
voluntary disclosure (e.g., Linda Smith Bamber, Jiang, & Wang, 2010; Brochet, Faurel, 
& McVay, 2011; Davis, Ge, Matsumoto, & Zhang, 2014). Specifically, individual 
characteristics, such as CEO ability and work experience, and personal connections 
within the top management team are found to affect voluntary disclosure quality (Baik, 
Farber, & Lee, 2011; Ke, Li, Ling, & Zhang, 2014; Matsunaga, Wang, & Yeung, 2014). 
This evidence suggests that individual managers influence disclosure outcomes because 
they each possess specific knowledge and expertise. However, if top executives work 
together to exchange, interpret, and integrate unstructured information to project future 
earnings, it is likely that the knowledge composition of top management, as a whole, 
impacts the quality of financial information. In this study I provide evidence on this issue 
by examining the relation between top management team (hereafter, TMT) functional 
diversity and management forecast accuracy. 
An earnings forecast is generally compiled from unaudited internal management 
reports and formal or informal meetings concerning firm operating, financing, and 
investing activities (Feng, Li, & McVay, 2009; Li, Minnis, Nagar, & Rajan, 2014). In 
forming the consolidated forecasts, members of the top management team work together 
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to gather, analyze, and integrate the forward-looking information which is often non-
verifiable at the time of forecast. Each individual executive uses their knowledge and 
expertise to accumulate and evaluate information in order to derive an expectation of 
future earnings. As a team, the executives share and discuss the specific information and 
knowledge each member possesses. As such, the functional diversity of the TMT is likely 
to impact the team’s ability to form an accurate forecast both by influencing the diversity 
of information considered and the ability to communicate and process the information.  
As a result, TMT functional diversity should influence the accuracy of forecasted 
earnings.   
TMT members’ functional backgrounds are often regarded as an important source 
of expertise and therefore influence the manner in which information is retrieved and 
exchanged to reach decisions (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002; Cannella, Park, & Lee, 
2008). The literature on TMT research generally defines two concepts of TMT 
composition based on functional backgrounds. The first is called between-member 
functional diversity and refers to the heterogeneity in the primary functional experiences 
of each TMT member. The second, within-member functional diversity, measures the 
average intrapersonal breadth of functional experiences for each TMT.  
Prior literature argues that TMTs with higher between-member functional 
diversity are able to draw from a greater pool of knowledge and information as each 
individual contributes their own personal expertise, and thus tend to stimulate more 
effective decision-making and improve team effectiveness in information processing. 
Consistent with this argument, empirical studies have shown that between-member 
functionally diverse teams have better firm performance and are more creative (e.g., Bell, 
Villado, Lukasik, Belau, & Briggs, 2010; Certo, Lester, Dalton, & Dalton, 2006). 
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Similarly, the extant TMT research recognizes that within-member functional diversity 
can benefit team performance. Individuals with broader functional experiences are more 
likely to share common functional background with others, thus reducing the semantic 
gap among team members and facilitating effective communication. Cannella et al. (2008) 
report positive relations between this type of diversity and firm performance. Effective 
and accurate information retrieval, exchange and integration are particularly important in 
order for TMTs to issue accurate guidance. Assuming that TMT functional diversity 
facilitates information processing and sharing, I hypothesize a positive relation between 
management earnings forecasts and TMT functional diversity.  
To test this hypothesis, I start with a sample of S&P 1500 firms during fiscal 
years from 2001 to 2012. TMT members include the CEO, CFO, and the three other most 
highly paid executives. Using the BoardEx database which provides biographical 
information on directors and senior executives of US public and private firms, I construct 
the Blau index of between-member and within-member functional diversity for each 
TMT and firm-year (Cannella et al., 2008; Harrison & Klein, 2007). Following a rich 
TMT literature, I use dominant functional diversity to measure the between-member 
diversity and intrapersonal functional diversity to measure the within-member diversity. 
Dominant functional diversity considers the heterogeneity of functional expertise 
available to a TMT, while intrapersonal functional diversity refers to the aggregate 
breadth of team members’ functional experiences (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002; 
Cannella et al., 2008). I find evidence that each type of TMT functional diversity 
improves management forecast accuracy. These findings hold after accounting for the 
self-selection associated with management forecasts and the potential endogeneity 
associated with TMT functional diversity. Specifically, I find that a one standard 
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deviation increase in dominant (intrapersonal) functional diversity is associated with an 
increase in management forecast accuracy that is equivalent to 6.2% (5.4%) of the sample 
mean forecast accuracy.   
I next conduct a series of cross-sectional analyses to explore the contexts under 
which TMT functional diversity has a greater impact on management forecast accuracy. 
If greater functional diversity enhances the quality of information exchanged and 
integrated in forming the management forecast, I would expect it to have a greater effect 
on firms with a greater degree of uncertainty in earnings and with more complex structure 
because in such cases firms are likely to benefit more from the breadth and 
communication of information in the top management. The evidence supports this 
contention for both types of functional diversity. In addition, I expect the functional 
experiences of the CEO or CFO who leads the management forecast task moderate the 
importance of team diversity. The association between TMT functional diversity and 
forecast accuracy is found to be less important when the CEO or CFO is a functional 
generalist, indicating that the presence of a generalist leader reducing the importance of 
the other TMT members’ functional knowledge.   
This study contributes to the literature in two ways. First, it contributes to the 
recent strand of literature examining the “human elements” of management guidance 
(e.g., Linda Smith Bamber et al., 2010; Davis et al., 2014; Ke et al., 2014). Unlike most 
studies focusing on the individual manager effects, this study provides evidence on 
whether the composition of the top management team affects management forecast 
characteristics. Moreover, unlike recent research that examines how social connections 
among TMT members affect management forecast accuracy (Ke et al., 2014), this paper 
focuses on the effect of TMT composition of knowledge and expertise on the accuracy of 
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management disclosure. It thus provides insights into how an individual’s expertise 
interacts with the expertise of other team members to influence the overall quality of the 
team’s information.    
Second, this study provides evidence on how information is exchanged and 
integrated within a TMT through its members’ functional background. This 
understanding is important since it sheds light on the effective leadership structure of top 
management teams along the dimension of team members’ functional background. This 
paper differs from and complements studies on the effect of TMT functional diversity on 
firm performance or strategic decisions by focusing on the information exchange process 
and assessing a direct result of such exchange, namely, management voluntary 
information disclosure. The evidence that TMT functional diversity affects voluntary 
disclosure, a seemingly second-order decision, extends the range of corporate decisions 
in which TMT knowledge composition is known to play an economically significant role. 
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CHAPTER II 
TMT COMPOSITION, FUNCTIONAL DIVERSITY, AND HYPOTHESIS 
DEVELOPMENT  
Individual Executives, Top Management Team and Corporate Disclosure 
Prior literature identifies various economic determinants of voluntary disclosure. 
These studies find that firms issue less accurate forecasts when earnings are more 
uncertain and when the proprietary and litigation costs of disclosure are higher (e.g., 
Ajinkya et al., 2005; L. S. Bamber & Cheon, 1998). Existing research also finds that 
larger firms with greater analyst following are more likely to issue accurate disclosure 
and that higher quality governance and internal control are associated with more accurate 
forecasts (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Feng et al., 2009; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005; Lang & 
Lundholm, 1993).  
Recently the disclosure literature has focused on “human elements” as an 
important determinant of management forecast features. Drawing on Hambrick and 
Mason’s (1984) upper echelons theory, which posits that executives impose idiosyncratic 
influence on corporate decisions, Linda Smith Bamber et al. (2010) find that top paid 
managers, including CEO, CFO, and General Counsel (GC) each have an individual style 
that affects the likelihood of the issuance of a forecast and the characteristics of the 
resulting disclosure. Davis et al. (2014) find evidence that managerial styles influence the 
tone of earnings conference calls for CEOs and CFOs. Other studies identify underlying 
individual characteristics that are associated with managerial styles, and find that 
personal education and career background (Linda Smith Bamber et al., 2010; Davis et al., 
2014), CEO ability (Baik et al., 2011), CEO overconfidence (Hribar & Yang, 2013), and 
CEO’s prior CFO experience (Matsunaga et al., 2014) are able to explain the individual 
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styles. Kwak, Ro, and Suk (2012) find that the presence of a GC on the top management 
team leads to more frequent, accurate and conservative forecasts. The overall conclusion 
in this growing literature is that the individual CEO, CFO, or GC influences the quality of 
management guidance. 
 It is notable that a firm’s policies are generally regarded as collective outcomes of 
teamwork by its top executives (e.g., Bertrand & Schoar, 2003). The focus in the prior 
literature on individual officers overlooks the fact that each executive serves as an 
integral part of the team and team members complement each other’s knowledge and 
expertise (Hayes, Oyer, & Schaefer, 2006). Hambrick (2007) asserts that focusing on the 
features of TMTs yields stronger explanations of various corporate decisions and 
outcomes than the customary focus on the individual top manager alone. Investigating 
whether the top management as a group has an impact on management voluntary 
disclosures provides insights into how TMTs generate and aggregate information to form 
guidance. 
Research on TMTs often relies on the sociology theories of similarity attraction 
and social categorization to explain team effectiveness arising from social interactions 
among team members. This stream of theories advocates that individuals with similar 
attributes such as age, sex, and race are attracted to each other and tend to categorize 
themselves as the same social group, thereby leading to more effective and efficient 
processing of information. Following these theories, Ke et al. (2014) argue that personal 
connections among top executives that are established from either education (whether 
they attended the same school for college education) or work experience (whether they 
worked in the same firm) improve communication within the top management team, and 
document that the within-TMT social connections are associated with higher accuracy of 
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the voluntarily disclosed earnings. Thus, top executives as a team can influence 
management guidance above and beyond the effect of individual executives.  
However, social interaction is only one aspect of the top management team 
processes. The information-processing and cognitive resource theory of TMTs posits that 
the availability of highly job-related technical knowledge and expertise is vital to the 
team effectiveness (e.g., Bell et al., 2010; Harrison & Klein, 2007). Researchers have 
long argued that TMTs with a wider range of knowledge and perspectives are better able 
to interpret, evaluate, predict, and react to environmental changes (Cannella et al., 2008; 
Carpenter, 2002). Moreover, prior literature documents that managers voluntarily issue 
earnings forecasts with greater accuracy as a signal to the market that they are able to 
identify the underlying economic changes (Baik et al., 2011; Trueman, 1986). Based on 
these theories, the functional background of team members serves as an important source 
of knowledge and expertise that influences the degree to which information is processed 
and shared, alternative perspectives are formed and evaluated, and various decisions are 
made at the team level.   
Two Types of TMT Functional Diversity 
Cross-functional teams are prevalent in complex organizations (Brodbeck, 
Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, & Schulz-Hardt, 2007). Moreover, research on TMTs has 
repeatedly demonstrated the significance of functional experience to reveal differences in 
knowledge, expertise and perspectives of TMT members (C. Boone & Hendriks, 2009; 
Bunderson, 2003; Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002; Certo et al., 2006). Such differences 
provide important cognitive resources for TMTs to process complex and uncertain 
information (Donald C. Hambrick, 1995). 
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Based on prior literature, I use TMT functional background diversity to 
characterize the team-level differences in knowledge and expertise. Specifically, TMT 
functional background diversity is conceptualized in two different ways: between-
member and within-member TMT functional diversity. The commonly used between-
member TMT functional diversity measure, referred to as dominant functional diversity, 
is defined as the extent to which TMT members differ across the functional domains in 
which they spend the most time (e.g., C. Boone & Hendriks, 2009; Bunderson & 
Sutcliffe, 2002; Cannella et al., 2008). The within-member TMT functional diversity 
measure, referred to as intrapersonal functional diversity, is defined as the average 
breadth of the functional backgrounds of the individuals on a TMT (e.g., Bunderson & 
Sutcliffe, 2002; Cannella et al., 2008).  
The conceptualization of between-member functional diversity relies on the 
assumption that each executive brings specific functional knowledge to a TMT because 
individual experience is typically focused on a particular functional area (Bunderson & 
Sutcliffe, 2002). This type of diversity reflects the extent to which the backgrounds 
among team members cover a wide range of functional areas. The extent to which the 
TMT members’ dominant functions are evenly distributed across a range of functional 
categories is indicative of both the breadth and the balance of knowledge, perspectives, 
and capabilities that a TMT as a whole can bring to bear in decision-making (Bunderson 
& Sutcliffe, 2002; Cannella et al., 2008). In contrast, the conceptualization of within-
member function diversity recognizes the fact that many executives obtain experiences 
outside their dominant functional career track. Specifically, TMT intrapersonal functional 
diversity measures the extent to which the TMT members are functional specialists or 
generalists, that is, whether the individuals have experiences in a limited or wide range of 
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functional domains. Section 3.2 details how the two types of TMT functional diversity 
are measured and provides examples of the calculation. 
Hypothesis Development 
Prior research documents a variety of benefits arising from TMTs with a high 
degree of dominant functional diversity. A TMT with higher dominant functional 
diversity can draw on a greater pool of knowledge and expertise. Therefore, diverse 
teams can generate a wider range of perspectives, which should lead to better evaluation 
of alternatives and thus more effective decision making (e.g., Bell et al., 2010; Bunderson 
& Sutcliffe, 2002; Cannella et al., 2008; Harrison & Klein, 2007). As a result, TMT 
dominant functional diversity enhances the overall team capacity to interpret, predict and 
react to the overload of unstructured and forward-looking information, thereby increasing 
the accuracy of management voluntary disclosure. Thus, my first hypothesis, stated in 
alternative form, is as follows: 
H1: Ceteris paribus, TMT between-member functional diversity is positively 
associated with management forecast accuracy. 
H1 predicts a positive effect of TMT between-member functional diversity on 
management forecast accuracy. However, prior literature on TMTs suggests that TMT 
between-member functional diversity may carry certain costs. The functional background 
differences among TMT members can create dysfunctional conflicts, provoke team 
fragmentation, and slow the decision-making process (Bunderson, 2003; Harrison & 
Klein, 2007). Thus, the impact of TMT functional diversity on management forecast 
accuracy is an empirical question.  
Intrapersonal functional diversity may benefit TMTs in several ways. First, when 
individual executives face complex and ambiguous situations that require consideration 
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of tradeoffs between multiple and often incompatible objectives, they tend to focus on the 
aspects that reflect their specific experiences and knowledge (Donald C. Hambrick, 2007). 
Individuals with a breadth of functional backgrounds are likely more open-minded and 
less susceptible to functionally grounded stereotypes, thereby leading to fewer cognitive 
biases at the TMT level (Cannella et al., 2008; Raskas & Hambrick, 1992). As a result, 
TMTs with high intrapersonal function diversity tend to have more effective information 
sharing and integration (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002). Second, a team of top executives 
characteristic of high intrapersonal functional diversity tend to have members with 
overlapping knowledge and perspectives since each individual has a broad background, 
thus facilitating mutual understanding (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002). Third, generalist 
executives are more likely to possess sufficient and appropriate knowledge that make 
them better prepared to understand complex forward-looking information (Burke & 
Steensma, 1998). Overall, members of TMTs with high intrapersonal functional diversity 
are better able to share and integrate information, thereby leading to more accurate 
forecasts. Accordingly, my second hypothesis (in alternative form) is as follows: 
H2: Ceteris paribus, TMT within-member functional diversity is positively 
associated with management forecast accuracy. 
Admittedly, within-member functional diversity also has some drawbacks. The 
fact that executives possess a wide range of functional experiences and knowledge might 
also imply the absence of a deep understanding of any single functional area (Cannella et 
al., 2008). Moreover, generalist executives might discount the expertise of the other 
executives, refraining them from consulting their fellow members (Buyl, Boone, 
Hendriks, & Matthyssens, 2011; Daily & Johnson, 1997). To the extent that functional 
generalists are limited in their ability to fully understand the deep and specialized 
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knowledge of their fellow executives, the positive effect of within-member functional 
diversity on management forecast accuracy would be mitigated.  
The foregoing discussion suggests that the TMT between-member and within-
member functional diversities are positively associated with management forecast 
accuracy. In addition, I expect the strength of the relation to differ based on firm 
characteristics, such as information uncertainty and organizational complexity, and the 
functional expertise of the CEO and CFO. 
It is more challenging for TMT members to interpret, exchange, and integrate 
forward-looking information in firms with greater uncertainty. If between-member 
functional diversity leads TMTs to issue more accurate forecasts by offering a greater 
pool of knowledge, this effect will become more positive as information uncertainty 
increases. Similarly, if TMTs with greater within-member functional diversity tend to 
issue more accurate forecasts, the effects of intrapersonal diversity on forecast accuracy 
are expected to be more positive for firms with greater information uncertainty. 
Similarly, it is more difficult for executives to gather and integrate information for 
more complex firms. Because complex firms operate in multiple product markets and 
geographical areas, the executives tend to rely on each other to make sense of 
information dispersed in the segments and to integrate information related to various 
functional domains. I therefore expect the effects of between-member and within-
member functional diversity on forecast accuracy to be stronger for more complex firms.  
Based on the above discussion, I form the third hypothesis as follows:  
H3a: Ceteris paribus, the relation between TMT between-member functional 
diversity and management forecast accuracy is stronger for firms with greater 
information uncertainty and more complex organizational structure. 
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H3b: Ceteris paribus, the relation between TMT within-member functional 
diversity and management forecast accuracy is stronger for firms with greater 
information uncertainty and more complex organizational structure. 
Prior literature finds that CEOs and CFOs are the key players in setting 
management forecasts (Linda Smith Bamber et al., 2010; Brochet et al., 2011; Hui & 
Matsunaga, 2014). As the CEO holds the leading position in a TMT and the CFO is the 
highest ranked officer directly in charge of a firm’s disclosure policy, the CEO and CFO 
likely play a unique and decisive role in management forecasts. I therefore consider 
whether the association between TMT functional diversity and management disclosure 
varies with the characteristics of the CEO and CFO. As leaders of the management 
forecast process, CEOs or CFOs are ultimately responsible for integrating the exchanged 
information. As such, their ability to bridge diverse knowledge and perspectives are 
crucial to fulfill their job responsibilities. The presence of a generalist TMT leader causes 
the other team members’ functional knowledge somewhat redundant since the breath of 
CEO or CFO functional background might substitute for the TMT functional diversity 
(Buyl et al., 2011). The relation between TMT diversity and forecast accuracy should 
become less positive with a functionally diverse CEO or CFO. Thus, my last hypothesis 
(in alternative form) is as follows: 
H4a: Ceteris paribus, the relation between TMT between-member functional 
diversity and management forecast accuracy is weaker for firms that are led by CEO or 
CFO with greater functional diversity. 
H4b: Ceteris paribus, the relation between TMT within-member functional 
diversity and management forecast accuracy is weaker for firms that are led by CEO or 
CFO with greater functional diversity. 
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It is possible that generalist CEOs or CFOs have more common functional 
experiences with the other TMT members, thus reducing the semantic gap and facilitating 
shared understandings (Chattopadhyay, Glick, Miller, & Huber, 1999). In this case, the 
positive relation between TMT functional diversity and management forecast accuracy 
can be strengthened. Thus, the overall impact of a generalist CEO or CFO on the relation 
between functional diversity and management forecast accuracy is an empirical question. 
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CHAPTER III 
SAMPLE AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
Sample  
In this study, I focus on the CEO, CFO, and other executives who are among the 
top five compensated executives because they are the group of managers that are most 
likely to possess the financial information dispersed within the firm (Li et al., 2014). 
Panel A of Table 1 (See Appendix D for all tables) describes the sample selection process. 
I begin with a sample of firms included in the BoardEx database of Management 
Diagnostics Ltd that have compensation data available on Execucomp from 2001 through 
2012.
1
 My sample period begins in 2001, after the implementation of Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (Reg FD). I identify the CEO and CFO by their annual titles and other top 
executives by the total compensation available on ExecuComp.
2
 I obtain the complete 
work experience of the company executives from BoardEx in order to identify their 
functional backgrounds. I then merge the entire sample with Compustat, CRSP, First Call, 
I/B/E/S, and Thomson Reuters 13F form to obtain the data on the variables required for 
the analyses. After deleting firm-years with missing data required for the empirical tests, 
the final sample consists of 4,473 firm-year observations of the S&P 1500 firms. Panel B 
of Table 1 provides a breakdown of the sample firms by fiscal year. The percentage of 
                                                 
1
 The BoardEx database of Management Diagnostics Ltd reports the historical profile of 
each top manager and director since 2000. It collects and compiles biographical 
information on individual executives and directors of U.S. firms from various resources 
including SEC filings, U.S. stock, company websites and press releases, and other 
reliable press sources, such as the Financial Times and Wall Street Journal.  
 
2
 BoardEx started collecting data in 2003. As a result, firms that were delisted by 2003, 
but were part of the S&P 1500 index between 2001 and 2003, are not included in the 
BoardEx universe and thus not in my sample.  
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firm-years increases from 4% in 2001 to above 8% in 2005 mainly due to the increased 
coverage by BoardEx. Panel C of Table 1 presents the industry distribution of the sample 
based on the two-digit SIC classification. Not surprisingly, manufacturing firms account 
for the majority (42.57%) of the sample.  
Measures of TMT Functional Diversity 
Following prior literature, I use the Blau index to measure TMT dominant and 
intrapersonal functional diversity (Bunderson & Sutcliffe, 2002; Cannella et al., 2008; 
Harrison & Klein, 2007).
3,4
 I first obtain each executive’s complete work experience from 
BoardEx and then identify how long an executive has worked in each of the following 
eight functional domains: accounting and finance; marketing and sales; management; 
production and operations; R&D and engineering; law; personnel and labor relations; and 
other (Cannella et al., 2008). In order to measure TMT dominant functional diversity 
(Dominant FD), I identify the functional track an executive has spent the most time in, 
and then use Blau index to capture the distribution of functional expertise among TMT 
members (Cannella et al., 2008; Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001). Specifically, this index 
is calculated as 1-ΣPi
2
, where Pi is the proportion of a TMT in the ith functional area. The 
                                                 
3
 Blau index is widely used by management literature in calculating various kinds of 
diversity at the TMT level. It has the same arithmetic formula (i.e. 1-ΣSi
2
) as the 
Herfindal-Hirschman index commonly seen in accounting, finance, and economics 
literature. 
 
4
 In addition to the Blau index, functional diversity can also be measured by the 
Teachman (entropy) index (Harrison & Klein, 2007). The Blau index and Teachman 
index are highly positively correlated (coefficient=0.90 for dominant and 0.86 for 
intrapersonal functional diversity, respectively). The results are qualitatively similar 
using the Teachman index instead.  
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index ranges between zero and one, with values close to one indicative of higher diversity 
and values close to zero indicative of a TMT dominated by a single functional expertise. 
Appendix A illustrates construction of the TMT dominant functional diversity for 
American Eagle Outfitters (AEO), Hewlett-Packard (HP), and J.C. Penney (JCP). In 2012, 
HP’s TMT was composed of five executives, three with dominant functional background 
in general management, one in accounting, and one in R&D, leading to a dominant 
functional diversity score of 0.56. In comparison, only two of the five AEO executives 
had the same dominant functional background (i.e., sales), and each of the other three 
executives had a distinct functional experience (i.e., management, accounting, and HR), 
generating a higher score of 0.72. As discussed above, the maximum dominant diversity 
is achieved when each of the TMT members has a distinct primary functional domain as 
shown by JCP in 2011. It should be noted that TMT dominant diversity is different from 
the total number of dominant functions a team possesses. Suppose that HP’s Executive 
VP, David A. Donatelli, had a dominant functional experience in R&D rather than 
management. Although the sum of dominant functions remains the same, the diversity 
would increase to 0.64 (>0.56) because the actual TMT members’ dominant functions are 
highly concentrated on management, with three executives in management and only one 
in accounting and one in R&D. The hypothetical team is viewed as more diverse than the 
actual because the former is more balanced in the overall distribution of knowledge than 
the latter.  
To measure within-member functional background diversity, I follow the 
approach used by Cannella et al. (2008), and measure intrapersonal functional diversity 
(Intrapersonal FD) as the score (1-ΣPij
2
), where Pij, the proportion of executive i’s time 
spent in function j, is calculated for each TMT member and then the scores are averaged 
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across the team members. An individual is regarded as having a greater intrapersonal 
functional diversity if the individual has experiences in multiple functional areas and if 
the time s/he spent in each functional area is more evenly distributed. The measure also 
varies between zero and one, with zero the lowest intrapersonal functional diversity and 
one the highest intrapersonal functional diversity.
5
 Compared to AEO, HP’s TMT 
members, on average, possess a broader range of functional experiences. As a result, the 
TMT intrapersonal functional diversity is higher for HP (0.35) than for AEO (0.26). As 
discussed above, between-member and within-member functional diversity are two 
distinct concepts. An extreme case, as shown by J.C. Penney, could be that each TMT 
member has experience in only one, but different, functional area, thus having the 
maximum TMT dominant functional diversity while minimum intrapersonal functional 
diversity because each member is a functional specialist.    
Empirical Models for Main Analyses – H1 and H2 
In order to test the main hypotheses H1a and H1b, I estimate the following 
regression:  
           MF Accuracy = α0 + α1 Dominant FD + α2 Intrapersonal FD + Σακ Controlsκ +    
                                     ακ+1 IMR+ΣIndustry FE + ΣYear FE + Ɛ                             (1)  
 
The dependent variable is management forecast accuracy (MF Accuracy), 
measured as the negative of the absolute difference between annual management forecast 
and actual earnings, scaled by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year (e. g., 
Baik et al., 2011; Linda Smith Bamber et al., 2010). MF Accuracy is calculated based on 
                                                 
5
 It is reasonable to assume that an individual manager has sufficient exposure to a certain 
functional area regardless the length of her/is experience in that area (Cannella et al., 
2008). Thus, I calculate intrapersonal functional diversity by assuming that executives 
spent the same time in each of the functional domains they have worked with and similar 
results are obtained using this alternative measure for the hypothesis tests. 
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the point and range forecasts, and for the range estimates, the midpoint is counted as the 
management estimation. If a firm issued multiple forecasts for a year, I retain the latest 
forecast in my sample in order to avoid the problem caused by the inter-dependence of 
the same-year forecasts.
6
 The two types of TMT functional diversity, TMT dominant 
functional background diversity (Dominant FD) and intrapersonal functional background 
diversity (Intrapersonal FD) are the independent variables of interest. These functional 
diversity variables are measured at the beginning of the year so as to alleviate the 
potential endogeneity between TMT functional diversity and management forecast 
accuracy. Firm Controls are contemporaneous firm-level control variables. Industry FE 
and Year FE are industry and year-fixed effects, respectively. Appendix B presents the 
detailed variable definitions. All continuous variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
levels in order to mitigate the influence of extreme values. Because the sample consists of 
panel data, I use two-way (firm and year) cluster-robust standard errors to correct for 
cross-sectional and time-series dependence in the data (Gow, Ormazabal, & Taylor, 2010; 
Peterson, 2011).  
I control for the percentage of executives in the TMT who have functional 
experience in accounting and/or finance (Accounting) and in law (Legal) because 
Matsunaga et al. (2014) find that CEOs with accounting or finance backgrounds are able 
to predict earnings more accurately and Kwak et al. (2012) report that TMTs with a GC 
tend to issue more accurate forecasts. Including these control variables for team 
functional background mitigates the concern that my proxies for TMT functional 
                                                 
6
 In alternative tests, management forecast accuracy is calculated based on the earliest 
management forecast or the average of all forecasts if multiple forecasts were issued for 
the same year. The test results remain similar to those presented in this paper. 
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diversity merely capture the effect of the presence of accounting/financial and legal 
experts on the top management whose functional knowledge and experience seem to be 
more directly related to the task of management forecasts. 
Drawing on prior research, I control for a series of firm-specific characteristics 
that are found to be associated with management forecast accuracy. Controlling for these 
variables also helps to address the omitted correlated variable concern arising from the 
potential endogeneity of TMT functional diversity. I first control for firm size (Ln(MV)), 
measured as the natural logarithm of the market value of a firm’s common equity at the 
beginning of the fiscal year (Ajinkya et al., 2005). While larger firms tend to issue more 
accurate forecasts because they bear lower disclosure costs and face higher legal costs of 
issuing less accurate forecasts (Lang & Lundholm, 1993), they are also more complex. 
The ratio of market value to book value of common equity (Market to Book) is included 
to control for proprietary costs and information asymmetry (L. S. Bamber & Cheon, 
1998). Prior research has documented that firms tend to issue less accurate forecasts 
when there is greater risk and earnings are more uncertain (Ajinkya et al., 2005; Baginski 
& Hassell, 1997; Linda Smith Bamber et al., 2010; Kross, Ro, & Suk, 2011). I include 
stock return volatility (StdRet), earnings volatility (StdEPS), and analyst forecast 
dispersion (Dispersion) to control for the underlying uncertainty. Complexity (Segments) 
is included to control for the difficulty in projecting the performance of complex firms 
(Feng et al., 2009). I also control for the demand for information (Ln(Analyst)), the 
incentive to disclose information (Litigation), and operation performance (Loss and 
ChgROA). Following studies by Ajinkya et al. (2005) and Karamanou and Vafeas (2005), 
I include board independence (Independence) and institutional ownership (Institution) to 
control for corporate governance quality. In addition, surprise (MF Surprise) conveyed 
21 
  
by the forecast and horizon (Horizon) of the forecast are included in the model (Ajinkya 
et al., 2005). 
My dependent variable is forecast accuracy and the regression is estimated on a 
subsample of firms that issue management forecasts. As a result, the sample can be 
systematically biased because forecast accuracy can be observed only for TMTs who 
make the decision to issue forecasts. Therefore, I use the Heckman two-stage approach 
whereby I first model the forecast issuance decision and then use the inverse Mill’s ratio 
(IMR) to control for the self-selection bias (Lennox, Francis, & Wang, 2012). In the first-
stage, I estimate a Probit regression of a dummy variable indicating whether firms issued 
a forecast on all the control variables as defined in model (1) except MF Surprise and 
Horizon which are specific to issuance firms. To successfully control for endogeneity, an 
additional explanatory variable, which is valid to be excluded from model (1) but is an 
important determinant of forecast issuance, should be included in the selection model 
(Larcker & Rusticus, 2010; Lennox et al., 2012). Prior studies have documented that 
firms that have issued forecasts in the past are more likely to issue a forecast in the 
current fiscal period (Kasznik & Lev, 1995; Lee, Matsunaga, & Park, 2012). However, 
the existence of a prior disclosure is not expected to affect the forecast accuracy of 
current period and there is no such evidence in the literature. Thus, I include the 
percentage of management forecast occurrence in the past five years (Prior MF) as such 
an exclusion variable in the Probit model. The regression results for the first stage are 
presented in Appendix C.  
Empirical Models for Cross-Sectional Analyses – H3 and H4 
Hypotheses 3 and 4 examine cross-sectional differences in the relation between 
TMT between- and within-member functional diversity and management forecast 
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features based on the firm and TMT-leader characteristics. To test these hypotheses, I 
estimate the following model:  
            MF Accuracy = α0 + α1Dominant FD + α2Dominant FD  Conditional Factor +    
                                α3Intrapersonal FD + α4Intrapersonal FD  Conditional Factor +   
                                α5Conditional Factor + ΣακControlsκ + ακ+1IMR + ΣIndustry FE +  
                               ΣYear FE + Ɛ                                                                                       (2)  
 
The Conditional Factor is a conditioning variable that moderates the association 
between TMT functional diversity and management forecasts, including information 
uncertainty and organizational complexity (H3a and H3b), and CEO/CFO functional 
expertise generalism (H4a and H4b). Specifically, Conditional Factor is an indicator 
variable defined as one if the value is above the median of the corresponding 
characteristics and zero if equal to or below the median. The variable of interest is the 
interaction term of either Dominant FD or Intrapersonal FD with Conditional Factor, 
which captures the incremental effects of having a Conditional Factor above the median. 
All other variables are defined as above. As discussed in section 3.3, I include inverse 
mills ratio (IMR) to control for the potential sample selection bias. 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A of Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on the regression variables. The 
statistics for Dominant FD and Intrapersonal FD indicate that, by construction, the two 
measures have values distributed between 0 and 1. As the sample is constructed from the 
S&P 1500 index, the firms are significantly larger (mean Ln(MV) of 7.917), more mature 
(mean market to book of 2.950), more complex (mean Segments of 5.458), have better 
performance (mean Loss of 0.072), and better governance (mean Institution of 0.780 and 
mean Independence of 0.792) as compared to the firms covered in the Compustat 
universe over the same time period (results untabulated). Moreover, both Dominant FD 
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and Intrapersonal FD are higher for the TMTs of sample firms than for those of the 
Compustat firms.  
Panel B of Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation table of the key variables. TMT 
between-member functional diversity is significantly positively correlated with 
management forecast accuracy (coefficient=0.02). TMT within-member functional 
diversity is also positively, albeit insignificantly, correlated with forecast accuracy 
(coefficient=0.01). These correlations suggest that both types of TMT functional diversity 
might lead managers to issuing more accurate forecasts. It is notable that while TMT 
intrapersonal and dominant functional diversity are positively correlated, the coefficient 
(0.05) is relatively low, suggesting that within-member diversity and between-member 
diversity capture different aspects of TMT composition.  
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CHAPTER IV 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
Tests of H1 and H2 – Main Analyses 
Table 3 reports the OLS test results of H1 and H2 using the aforementioned 
regression model (1). The coefficient on TMT dominant functional diversity is 
significantly positive (0.011, t-statistic=2.74), suggesting that on average cross-member 
function diversity enhances management forecast accuracy. The coefficient on TMT 
intrapersonal functional diversity is also significantly positive (0.011, t-statistic=2.42), 
suggesting a positive association between within-member functional diversity and the 
accuracy of management issued forecasts. On average, one standard deviation increase in 
TMT dominant (intrapersonal) functional diversity is associated with an increase in 
management forecast accuracy by 6.2% (5.4%) of the mean accuracy.   
The results for the control variables are generally consistent with prior literature 
(Ajinkya et al., 2005; Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). I find that firm size is negatively, and 
market to book is positively, associated with management forecast accuracy. As expected, 
the coefficients on stock volatility, analyst forecast dispersion, earnings volatility, 
segments, loss, absolute change in ROA, management forecast surprise, and forecast 
horizon are significantly negative.  
Overall, the results reported in Table 3 are consistent with H1 and H2 which 
predicts that between-member and within-member functional diversities are positively 
associated with the accuracy of management forecast. 
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Tests of H3a and H3b – the Conditioning Effects of Firm Characteristics 
To test H3a and H3b, I examine whether the relationship between the TMT 
functional diversity and management forecast accuracy is stronger in firms with greater 
uncertainty and complexity. I estimate model (2) to conduct this set of tests in which the 
Conditional Factor is set equal to one if the proxy for uncertainty or complexity is above 
the sample median and zero otherwise. The interaction terms in the model indicate 
whether the strength of the association between TMT functional diversity and 
management forecast accuracy is different for firms with higher Conditional Factor. The 
regression results are presented in Panel A and B of Table 4. 
The first set of results uses uncertainty in earnings as the conditional factor. The 
proxies for uncertainty include StdRet, Dispersion, and StdEPS, and the OLS regression 
results are presented in Panel A. The coefficients on the interaction of TMT dominant 
and intrapersonal functional diversity with each proxy for uncertainty are significantly 
positive. In addition, it is noted that the coefficients on Dominant FD and Intrapersonal 
FD are no longer significant in these analyses, suggesting that none of the TMT 
functional diversities affects management forecast accuracy for firms with lower 
uncertainty in earnings. Overall, the results in Panel A of Table 4 are consistent with the 
impact of both between-member and within-member functional diversity being stronger 
in firms with greater uncertainty in earnings where TMTs are more likely to benefit from 
the availability of a large pool of perspectives and effective communication.  
The second firm characteristic examined is business complexity. Specifically, I 
examine whether the relationship between the TMT functional diversity and management 
forecast accuracy is stronger in firms with more business segments. The Conditional 
Factor is set equal to one if the number of business segments is above the sample median 
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and zero otherwise. The interaction term in the model captures whether the strength of 
the association between TMT function diversity and management forecast accuracy is 
different for firms with above- or below-the-average complexity. I present the regression 
results in Panel B of Table 4. I find that the positive effect of TMT dominant and 
intrapersonal functional diversity on the forecast accuracy is significantly stronger in 
firms with more diverse geographical and business operations (t-statistic=2.69 and 2.02, 
respectively). However, the coefficients on Dominant FD and Intrapersonal FD are 
insignificant in Panel B, indicating that TMT functional diversity does not influence 
forecast accuracy for firms with less complex organizational structure. Overall, the 
results in Panel B support the prediction that the impact of each type of functional 
diversity is stronger in more complex firms where a broader set of knowledge and 
perspectives leads to more information incorporated in the forecast process.   
Tests of H4a and H4b – the Conditioning Effects of TMT Leader Characteristics 
To test H4a and H4b, I examine whether the relationship between the TMT 
functional diversity and management forecast accuracy varies with the characteristics of 
the executive leading the management forecast process. Specifically, I investigate 
whether the importance of TMT diversity differs with the breadth of the CEO or CFO’s 
functional background because the CEO or CFO is ultimately responsible for integrating 
the unstructured information gathered from all other TMT members. Current literature 
has documented that CEO and CFO both are key players in management forecast 
activities (Linda Smith Bamber et al., 2010; Brochet et al., 2011). There is also evidence 
that firms tie CEO and CFO compensation to the accuracy of the management disclosure 
accuracy (Hui & Matsunaga, 2014). I estimate model (2) by constructing two Conditional 
Factors, CEO and CFO generalism, which is set equal to one when a CEO or CFO has 
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experience in more functional domains than the sample median and zero otherwise. The 
interaction term in the model then captures whether the strength of the association 
between TMT functional diversity and management forecast accuracy is different for 
CEOs or CFOs with broad work experiences and those with narrow functional 
background. 
Table 5 presents the OLS regression results.
 
The coefficients on the interaction of 
dominant functional diversity and CEO functional diversity are -0.006 (t-statistic=-1.94). 
This result supports the conclusion that TMT between-member functional diversity 
enhances management forecast accuracy less when the team is led by a generalist CEO. 
This finding suggests that CEO functional diversity and between-member functional 
diversity are substitutes and that the other TMT members’ functional knowledge becomes 
less important due to the presence of a generalist CEO, thereby reducing the ability for 
the team as a whole to reap the benefits of diverse functional knowledge.
 7
  
For this set of tests, intrapersonal functional diversity is measured for team 
members other than the CEO since CEO functional diversity is a separate variable 
already included in the regression. The correlation between CEO functional diversity and 
TMT intrapersonal (excluding CEO) functional diversity is 0.154 (results untabulated, p-
value=0.00), suggesting that a generalist CEO is more likely to attract and recruit other 
top executives who are also functional generalists. The coefficients on the interaction of 
intrapersonal function diversity and CEO functional diversity are -0.012 (t-statistic=-
2.09). Thus, TMT within-member functional diversity seems to enhance management 
                                                 
7
 It is interesting to note that the correlation between CEO functional diversity and TMT 
(excluding CEO) dominant functional diversity is 0.075 (results untabulated, p-
value=0.00), suggesting that a TMT led by a generalist CEO is more likely to have other 
team members who collectively have a broad range of dominant functional experiences. 
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forecast accuracy less if the team is headed by a generalist CEO than a specialist CEO. 
The results suggest that a TMT would benefit from having a specialist CEO when the 
other team members are generalists.   
Table 5 also reports the results for CFO functional diversity.
8
 The significantly 
negative coefficients on the interaction term of TMT functional diversity and CFO 
functional diversity suggest that CFO functional diversity also substitutes for TMT 
between-member diversity. When a generalist CFO is responsible for the forecast task, 
the TMT benefits less from being more functionally diverse. Similarly, the association 
between TMT intrapersonal functional diversity and forecast accuracy is also weaker in 
the presence of a generalist CFO. Overall, the results in Table 5 support that generalist 
CFOs with their wide range of functional experiences can substitute for high TMT 
functional diversity. 
   
 
 
 
                                                 
8
 The correlation between CFO functional diversity and intrapersonal functional diversity 
of the rest of the TMT is 0.129 (results untabulated, p-value=0.00), suggesting that a 
generalist CFO is more likely to join a TMT where other top executives are also 
functional generalists. In contrast, the correlation between CFO functional diversity and 
TMT (excluding CFO) dominant functional diversity is insignificant (results untabulated, 
coef.=-0.019 and p-value=0.20), indicating that CFO functional diversity is not associated 
with dominant functional diversity of the rest of the TMT. 
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CHAPTER V 
ADDITIONAL ANALYSES AND SENSITIVITY CHECKS 
Instrumental Variable Approach 
It is possible that TMT functional diversity is endogenously determined by the 
firm, and the same set of factors may jointly affect both TMT functional diversity and 
management forecast accuracy. In other words, firms with higher TMT functional 
diversity may provide more accurate management forecasts even absent the effects of this 
diversity in top management. To address this issue, I employ the instrumental variable 
approach using a two-stage model in addition to the OLS regression. There are two 
endogenous variables in model (1), dominant FD and intrapersonal FD. The key is to 
identify proper instrumental variables that satisfy the exclusion and relevance conditions 
(Kennedy, 2008; Larcker & Rusticus, 2010).  
The first set of instruments is motivated by the attraction-selection-attrition (i.e., 
ASA) theory which posits that certain types of firms attract, select and retain certain 
types of individuals (e.g., Christophe Boone, Van Olffen, Van Witteloostuijn, & 
Brabander, 2004; Nielsen, 2009). Firms with higher diversity in either dominant or 
intrapersonal functional background are likely to emphasize the presence of diverse 
knowledge and perspectives on the top management. As such, when recruiting new 
executives, TMTs with higher dominant or intrapersonal functional diversity are more 
likely to hire individuals who have experience in multiple functional tracks or have 
distinct functional backgrounds from the existing members so as to maintain the high 
diversity of functional knowledge in TMTs. The predecessor TMT, from which at least 
one member is replaced by a new person, is different from the successor TMT because 
they are composed of different individuals. Thus, there is no reason to expect functional 
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diversity of the predecessor TMT to affect the management forecast accuracy for the 
current year. Therefore, I use the predecessor TMT’s dominant (Prior Dominant FD) and 
intrapersonal (Prior Intrapersonal FD) functional diversity as an instrumental variable 
for Dominant FD and Intrapersonal FD, respectively.  
The next instrument is firm performance just prior to the formation of the current 
TMT (Prior ROE). Prior studies have documented that firms are urged to change when 
performance is poor, which triggers hiring more dissimilar managers so as to broaden the 
pool of skills, knowledge and abilities to fulfill the change (e.g., Christophe Boone et al., 
2004). Therefore, I expect firms with lower Prior ROE to change their dominant FD and 
intrapersonal FD because both types of diversity can help initiate and implement changes 
by providing necessary knowledge. However, there is little reason to expect prior firm 
performance, generated by the predecessor management team, to be directly related to 
current period management forecast activities.  
Table 6 reports the 2SLS test results of H1 and H2 using the aforementioned 
regression model (1). Column (1) and (2) of Table 6 report the first-stage regressions for 
dominant and intrapersonal functional diversity, respectively. All three instruments are 
significant in explaining dominant functional diversity (column (1)) and with expected 
signs. Prior Intrapersonal FD and Prior ROE are significant in the first-stage regression 
for intrapersonal functional diversity (column (2)), and the third instrument (Prior 
Dominant FD) has the expected sign, although it is not significant. Specifically, firms are 
more likely to form a new TMT with high functional diversity when prior firm 
performance is low and when prior TMT functional diversity is high. Diagnostic tests 
provide further evidence that the equations are well-specified. The Angrist-Pischke F-
Statistic for weak identification is 413.10 (p-value<0.001) and 1663.38 (p-value<0.001) 
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for the first-stage regression on Dominant FD and Intrapersonal FD, respectively, 
meaning that the model is adequately identified by the instruments. The Hansen J-
statistic (p-value=0.27) is not significant at the conventional level, indicating that the null 
hypothesis that the instruments are uncorrelated with the errors in the second-stage 
regression cannot be rejected and thus the instruments are correctly excluded from the 
second-stage regression. Column (3) of Table 6 reports the second stage regression 
results. I find that the coefficients on predicted TMT dominant and intrapersonal 
functional diversity are significantly positive (t-stat=1.75 and 2.02, respectively). The 
results indicate that the main findings hold after controlling for potential endogeneity 
concern. 
The 2SLS methodology is also used to address the concern of TMT functional 
diversity being endogenously determined in the cross-sectional analyses. There are four 
endogenous variables in model (2), Dominant FD, Intrapersonal FD, Dominant FD  
Conditional Factor, and Intrapersonal FD  Conditional Factor, resulting in four first-
stage regressions, one for each endogenous variable. In each of these first-stage 
regressions, I include the three instruments discussed in section 3.3 (i.e., Prior ROE, 
Prior Dominant FD, and Prior Intrapersonal FD) and the interaction of each of the three 
instruments with the corresponding Conditional Factor (Field, Lowry, & Mkrtchyan, 
2013; Wooldridge, 2010 pp. 267-268). The regression results are shown in Table 7. 
Panel A of Table 7 shows the set of 2SLS regressions where uncertainty in 
earnings and firm complexity are the conditional factors. Panel B reports the results 
concerning CEO and CFO generalism. The diagnostic tests of the 2SLS model suggest 
that the instruments satisfy the relevance and exclusion requirements for valid IVs. The 
coefficients on the interaction of TMT dominant and intrapersonal functional diversity 
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with conditional factors are statistically significant in the expected direction. Overall, the 
results in Panel A and B of Table 7 suggest that the cross-sectional analyses remain valid 
after addressing the potential endogeneity problem.   
Complements versus Substitutes of the Two Types of TMT Functional Diversity 
In the main analyses, I find that both dominant functional diversity and 
intrapersonal functional diversity are associated with greater management forecast 
accuracy. As discussed above, they represent two distinct types of TMT diversity. If a 
TMT is composed of executives each having a different, primary functional domain and 
also possessing a breadth of other functional knowledge, the team will have a large pool 
of knowledge available for problem solving and better communication among members 
thanks to the overlap of their knowledge. However, it may not be necessary for a team to 
be high in both types of TMT functional diversity because high diversity in either one can 
provide a scope of knowledge and perspectives to the team a whole. As a result, it is not 
clear, ex ante, whether the two are substitutes or complements to each other. To explore 
this question, I estimate model (1) after including an interaction between dominant and 
intrapersonal functional diversity. Table 8 reports the regression results. The coefficients 
on the interaction term are significantly negative, suggesting that the two types of TMT 
functional diversity are substitutes, rather than complements. 
Robustness Checks 
Prior research indicates that the GC plays an important monitoring role in 
management voluntary disclosure, but unlike the CEO or CFO, GC is not always among 
the top five executives (Kwak et al., 2012). To mitigate the concern that the prior results 
are driven by the inclusion of GC, I exclude the observations (1,472 firm-years) for 
which GC is one of the top five and rerun the regressions in table 3 and 4. The unreported 
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results are similar to those reported in the paper, suggesting that the documented results 
are robust to the inclusion of GC in TMT. 
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CHAPTER VI 
CONCLUSION 
In this study I investigate whether the TMT functional background composition 
affects the team effectiveness in the context of management voluntary information 
disclosure. I examine the impact of two distinct types of TMT functional diversity, 
namely cross-member and within-member diversity, on the management forecast 
accuracy. I find that both types of functional diversity are associated with more accurate 
management disclosure. I also find that both the overall breadth of dominant functional 
expertise distributed across TMT members and the average within-member breadth of 
functional experience are more important for firms with more uncertainty and greater 
organizational complexity and for firms that are led by a CEO or CFO who is a narrow 
functional specialist. Together, these results suggest that TMT functional diversity plays 
an important role in management disclosure. Overall, this study provides further insights 
into the human element as determinants of corporate disclosures by documenting how 
information is shared and integrated by the top management team via their functional 
knowledge and expertise. 
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APPENDIX A 
EXAMPLES OF DOMINANT AND INTRAPERSONAL FUNCTIONAL DIVERSITY  
TMT Member Name Current Title Functional Experience 
   
American Eagle Outfitters, Inc. (ended 1/28/2012) 
James V. O’Donnell  
 
Chief Executive Officer  - 26 years in management; 
- 6 years in production and operations; 
- 3 years in accounting and finance; 
- 3 years in other. 
 
Joan Holstein Hilson 
 
Chief Financial Officer - 24 years in accounting and finance; 
- 9 years in management. 
 
Roger S. Markfield 
 
Chief Design Officer - 32 years in sales and marketing; 
- 9 years in management; 
- 2 years in R&D and engineering. 
 
Fredrick W. Grover Executive Vice President – brand merchandising, 
marketing & AE direct 
 
- 22 years in sales and marketing. 
Thomas A. DiDonato  Executive Vice President – human resources 
 
- 29 years in personnel and labor relations. 
Dominant FD: Blau index = 1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑘
2𝑐
𝑘=1 = 1-[(1/5)
2
+(1/5)
2
+(2/5)
2
+(1/5)
2
] = 0.72 
 
Intrapersonal FD: Blau index = ∑ (1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑘
2𝑐
𝑘=1 )/𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1  = (1-[(26/38)
2
+(6/38)
2
+(3/38)
2
+(3/38)
2
]+1-[(24/33)
2
+(9/33)
2
]+1-[(32/43)
2
+(9/43)
2
+(2/43)
2
] 
+1-(22/22)
2
 +1-(29/29)
2 
) / 5 = 0.26 
   
Hewlett-Packard (HP) Co (ended 10/31/2012) 
Margaret C. Whitman Chief Executive Officer - 28 years in management; 
- 5 years in marketing and sales. 
 
Catherine A. Lesjak Chief Financial Officer - 13 years in accounting and finance; 
- 1 year in marketing and sales. 
 
David A. Donatelli Executive Vice President - 12 years in management; 
- 10 years in production and operations; 
- 3 years in R&D and engineering; 
- 2 years in marketing and sales. 
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Giovanni J. Visentin Executive Vice President - 23 years in management; 
- 4 years in R&D and engineering; 
- 1 year in marketing and sales. 
 
John M. Hinshaw Executive Vice President - 15 years in R&D and engineering; 
- 4 years in management; 
- 1 year in production and operations. 
 
Dominant FD: Blau index = 1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑘
2𝑐
𝑘=1 = 1-[(3/5)
2
+(1/5)
2
+(1/5)
2
] = 0.56 
 
Intrapersonal FD: Blau index = ∑ (1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑘
2𝑐
𝑘=1 )/𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1  = (1-[(28/33)
2
+(5/33)
2
] +1-[(13/14)
2
+(1/14)
2
] + 1-[(12/27)
2
+(10/27)
2
+(3/27)
2
+(2/27)
2
] + 1-
[(23/28)
2
+(4/28)
2
+(1/28)
2
] + 1-[(15/20)
2
+(4/20)
2
+(1/20)
2
]) / 5 = 0.35 
   
J.C. Penney Co (ended 01/31/2011) 
Myron E. Ullman, III Chief Executive Officer - 31 years in management 
 
Robert B. Cavanaugh Chief Financial Officer - 16 years in accounting and finance 
 
Michael T. Theilmann Group Executive Vice President - 18 years in personnel and labor relations 
 
Thomas M. Nealon Group Executive Vice President - 28 years in R&D and engineering 
 
Janet Dhilon General Counsel - 20 years in law 
 
Dominant FD: Blau index = 1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑘
2𝑐
𝑘=1 = 1-[(1/5)
2
+(1/5)
2
+(1/5)
2
+(1/5)
2
+(1/5)
2
] = 0.80 
 
Intrapersonal FD: Blau index = ∑ (1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑘
2𝑐
𝑘=1 )/𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1  = (1-(31/31)
2
 + 1-(16/16)
2
 + 1-(18/18)
2
 + 1-(28/28)
2
 + 1-(20/20)
2
) / 5 = 0 
 
This appendix illustrates the calculation of dominant and intrapersonal functional diversity using three firms from my sample. For each firm, I present 
the TMT member’s name, current title, and his/er functional experience up to the beginning of current year, followed by the calculation of the two types 
of diversity based on the functional background information. 
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APPENDIX B 
VARIABLE DEFINITIONS 
Variable Definition Source 
   
Dominant FD Blau index = 1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑘
2𝑐
𝑘=1 , 𝑃𝑘 is the proportion of a TMT in the kth category of dominant functional 
track, c is the total number of functional areas under study. 
 
BoardEx 
Intrapersonal FD  Blau index = ∑ (1 − ∑ 𝑃𝑖𝑘
2𝑐
𝑘=1 )/𝑛
𝑛
𝑖=1 , 𝑃𝑖𝑘 is the proportion of executive i’s total years spent in function k, 
n is the total number of TMT members.  
 
BoardEx 
Prior Dominant FD Dominant FD of the predecessor TMT, where at least one member is replaced by a new executive in 
the current TMT. 
 
BoardEx 
Prior Intrapersonal 
FD 
Intrapersonal FD of the predecessor TMT, where at least one member is replaced by a new executive 
in the current TMT. 
 
BoardEx 
CEO generalism Equal to 1 if the number of functional domains that a CEO has experience in is more than the sample 
median of the number of functional areas a CEO has, and zero otherwise. 
 
BoardEx 
CFO generalism Equal to 1 if the number of functional domains that a CFO has experience in is more than the sample 
median of the number of functional areas a CFO has, and zero otherwise. 
 
BoardEx 
Accounting The percentage of TMT members who have functional experience in Accounting or Finance. 
 
BoardEx 
Legal The percentage of TMT members who have functional experience in Law. 
 
BoardEx 
MF Accuracy The negative of the absolute error in the management forecasts that firm i issued in year t (i.e., –
|forecast–actual|, adjusted for stock splitting). Specifically, I use the difference between the 
management forecast (using point forecasts and the midpoint of the range forecasts) and actual EPS, 
scaled by beginning stock price.  
 
First Call, 
I/B/E/S 
MF Surprise The absolute difference between management forecast and the most recent consensus analyst forecast 
of EPS, deflated by the stock price at the beginning of the fiscal year.  
 
First Call, 
I/B/E/S 
Horizon The number of days between the management forecast date and the end of the fiscal period of the 
forecasted earnings number. 
 
First Call, 
I/B/E/S 
Prior MF The percentage of management forecast occurrence in the past five years. First Call, 
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I/B/E/S 
 
StdRet  Standard deviation of daily stock returns for firm i over year t.  
 
CRSP 
StdRet(0,1) Equal to one if StdRet is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. 
 
CRSP 
Dispersion The standard deviation of analyst forecasts deflated by the absolute value of the median consensus 
forecast.  
 
I/B/E/S 
Dispersion(0,1) Equal to one if Dispersion is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. 
 
I/B/E/S 
StdEPS Standard deviation of firm i’s earnings per share over prior five years, deflated by stock price at the end 
of year t-1. 
 
Compustat 
StdEPS(0,1) Equal to one if StdEPS is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. 
 
Compustat 
Ln(Segments) Natural logarithm of geographical and business segments.  Compustat 
Segment 
 
Segments(0,1) Equal to one if Segments is above the sample median, and zero otherwise. 
 
Compustat 
Segment 
 
Ln(MV) Natural logarithm of market value of equity ($ millions).  
 
Compustat 
Market to Book The ratio of market value of equity over book value of equity.  
 
Compustat 
Loss Indicator variable that equals 1 if firm i reports a loss in year t, and 0 otherwise.  
 
Compustat 
ChgROA Absolute value of the change in firm i’s ROA from year t-1 to t.  
 
Compustat 
Litigation Coded as 1 if the firm i is a member of one of the following high-litigation-risk industries: SIC codes 
2833-2836 (biotechnology), 3570-3577 and 7370-7374 (computers), 3600-3674 (electronics), 5200-
5961 (retailing), and 8731-8734 (R&D service), and zero otherwise.  
 
Compustat 
Ln(Analyst) Log of the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts for firm i in year t.  
 
I/B/E/S 
Institution Percentage of firm i’s common stock held by institutions in year t, from Thomson Financial. 
 
Thomson 13F 
Independence Percentage of independent members of firm i’s board of directors during year t.  
 
BoardEx 
Prior ROE The rate of return on stockholders’ equity just prior to the formation of the current TMT. Compustat 
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IMR The Inverse Mill’s Ratio obtained from the Probit regression estimating the likelihood of management 
forecast issuance. See Appendix C for the regression results. 
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APPENDIX C 
ESTIMATION RESULTS OF THE PROBABILITY TO ISSUE  
MANAGEMENT EARNINGS FORECASTS  
 
VARIABLES Coef. z-stat p-value 
        
Prior MF 2.890*** 29.57 0.000 
Dominant FD 0.081 0.44 0.659 
Intrapersonal FD 0.259 1.36 0.175 
StdRet -6.327* -1.80 0.071 
Dispersion -0.643*** -7.42 0.000 
StdEPS 0.165 0.16 0.871 
Ln(Segments) -0.018 -0.34 0.735 
Ln(MV) -0.002 -0.07 0.948 
Market to Book -0.000 -0.04 0.970 
Loss -0.395** -2.49 0.013 
ChgROA -0.665*** -7.56 0.000 
Litigation 0.119 1.39 0.166 
Ln(Analyst) -0.021 -0.45 0.654 
Institution 0.503*** 3.65 0.000 
Independence 0.256 1.38 0.169 
Accounting -0.106 -1.16 0.244 
Legal 1.014** 2.51 0.012 
    Industry & Year FE               Yes   
Pseudo R
2 
             0.50   
Obs.          11,125   
This table presents the results of Probit regression to estimate the probability to issue a management 
forecast. All variables are defined as in Appendix B. Industry and year fixed effects and an intercept are 
included but unreported for brevity. Two-way (firm and year) cluster-robust standard errors are used to 
correct for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, 
and 10 percent levels (two-sided), respectively. 
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APPENDIX D 
TABLES 
Table 1. Sample Selection and Description 
Panel A: Sample Selection 
Procedure          Obs. 
Initial firm-year observations on the intersection of BoardEx and ExecuComp from 2001 to 2012 13,417 
Less: missing data from BoardEx  273 
Less: missing data for management forecast accuracy from First Call and I/B/E/S 7,802 
Less: missing data from Compustat and CRSP 403 
Less: missing data from I/B/E/S and Thomson 13F 466 
Total firm-year observations 4,473 
 
Panel B: Temporal Distribution of the Sample 
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total 
Obs. 186 224 286 308 362 483 506 468 387 407 421 435 4,473 
% 4.16 5.01 6.39 6.89 8.09 10.80 11.31 10.46 8.65 9.10 9.41 9.73 100 
 
Panel C: Industry Distribution of the Sample 
SIC code Industry Description     Obs.             % 
01-09 Agriculture, forestry & fishing 14 0.31 
10-14 Mining 59 1.32 
15-17 Construction 56 1.25 
20-39 Manufacturing 1,904 42.57 
40-49 Transportation, communications & utilities 609 13.62 
50-51 Wholesale trade 166 3.71 
52-59 Retail trade 566 12.65 
60-69 Finance, insurance & real estate 349 7.80 
70-88 Service industry 739 16.52 
 Other 11 0.25 
Total  4,473 100.00 
In this table, Panel A presents data on the derivation of the sample by firm-years. Panels B and C present the sample distribution by fiscal year and 2-
digit SIC industry, respectively.
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Table 2.Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Median Q1 Q3 
MF Accuracy 4,473 -0.022 0.052 -0.005 -0.002 -0.017 
Dominant FD 4,473 0.627 0.124 0.640 0.560 0.720 
Intrapersonal FD 4,473 0.472 0.108 0.488 0.407 0.552 
StdRet 4,473 0.023 0.011 0.021 0.016 0.028 
Dispersion 4,473 0.096 0.203 0.045 0.026 0.086 
StdEPS 4,473 0.018 0.023 0.010 0.006 0.021 
Segments 4,473 5.458 2.937 5.000 3.000 7.000 
Ln(MV) 4,473 7.917 1.392 7.801 6.906 8.862 
Market to Book 4,473 2.950 2.919 2.345 1.604 3.557 
Loss 4,473 0.072 0.153 0.000 0.000 0.000 
ChgROA 4,473 0.041 0.112 0.014 0.007 0.034 
Litigation 4,473 0.217 0.412 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Analyst 4,473 13.511 9.044 11.000 7.000 18.000 
Institution 4,473 0.780 0.162 0.804 0.682 0.903 
Independence 4,473 0.792 0.117 0.818 0.727 0.889 
Accounting 4,473 0.458 0.194 0.400 0.400 0.600 
Legal 4,473 0.076 0.086 0.000 0.000 0.093 
MF Surprise 4,473 0.004 0.010 0.001 0.000 0.003 
Horizon 4,473 115.034 52.298 103.000 91.000 118.000 
CEO Generalism 4,473 0.344 0.475 0.000 0.000 1.000 
CFO Generalism 4,473 0.318 0.466 0.000 0.000 1.000 
 
Panel B: Pearson correlation matrix of key variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. MF Accuracy 1.00        
2. Dominant FD 0.02 1.00       
3. Intrapersonal FD 0.01 0.05 1.00 
 
    
4. StdRet -0.32 0.00 -0.14 1.00     
5. Dispersion -0.34 0.00 -0.03 0.28 1.00    
6. StdEPS -0.37 0.02 -0.04 0.28 0.18 1.00   
7. Ln(Segments) -0.04 0.09 0.14 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 1.00  
8. CEO Generalism 0.01 0.09 0.45 -0.12 -0.04 -0.06 0.13 1.00 
9. CFO Generalism -0.02 -0.10 0.33 -0.06 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.07 
Panel A and B of Table 2 presents the summary statistics and the Pearson correlation for key variables, 
respectively. Correlations in bold are significant at the 10% level or better. 
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Table 3.TMT Functional Diversity and Management Forecast Accuracy 
 
  Pred. Coef.               t-stats 
Dominant FD + 0.011*** 2.74 
Intrapersonal FD + 0.011** 2.42 
StdRet  -0.342** -2.15 
Dispersion  -0.035*** -4.07 
StdEPS  -0.292** -2.23 
Ln(Segments)  -0.004** -2.57 
Ln(MV)  -0.004*** -8.30 
Market to Book  0.001*** 4.68 
Loss  -0.053*** -4.21 
ChgROA  -0.150** -2.20 
Litigation  0.002 0.58 
Ln(Analyst)  0.001 0.80 
Institution  -0.008 -1.26 
Independence  -0.007 -0.60 
Accounting  0.002 0.42 
Legal  -0.003 -0.38 
MF Surprise  -0.879*** -3.82 
Horizon  -0.000*** -5.73 
IMR  0.004* 1.87 
Industry & Year FE                 Included  
Adj. R
2
  0.42  
Obs.                 4,473  
Table 3 presents the results of OLS regressions to test H1 and H2. All variables are defined as in Appendix B. Industry 
and year fixed effects and an intercept are included but unreported for brevity. Two-way (firm and year) cluster-robust 
standard errors are used to correct for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels (two-sided), respectively. 
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Table 4.TMT Functional Diversity and Management Forecast Accuracy Conditional on Firm Characteristics 
  
Panel A: Uncertainty  
 
 StdRet  Dispersion  StdEPS 
  Pred. Coef. t-stats  Coef. t-stats  Coef. t-stats 
Dominant FD  -0.002 -0.52  -0.001 -0.26  -0.000 -0.11 
Intrapersonal FD  -0.001 -0.24  -0.006 -1.19  -0.003 -0.77 
Dominant FD  StdRet(0,1) + 0.028** 2.14       
Intrapersonal FD  StdRet(0,1) + 0.014** 2.33       
StdRet(0,1)  -0.028*** -2.68       
Dominant FD  Dispersion(0,1) +    0.025*** 2.84    
Intrapersonal FD  Dispersion(0,1) +    0.020* 1.92    
Dispersion(0,1)     -0.028*** -3.16    
Dominant FD  StdEPS(0,1) +       0.016*** 2.71 
Intrapersonal FD  StdEPS(0,1) +       0.019* 1.77 
StdEPS(0,1)        -0.024** -2.41 
StdRet     -0.358** -2.50  -0.560** -2.59 
Dispersion  -0.041*** -4.15     -0.030*** -2.86 
StdEPS  -0.212** -2.23  -0.170* -1.78    
Ln(Segments)  -0.004** -2.44  -0.003** -2.36  -0.003*** -2.73 
Ln(MV)  -0.003*** -3.54  -0.003*** -6.93  -0.004*** -6.14 
Market to Book  0.001*** 4.62  0.001*** 4.43  0.001*** 4.99 
Loss  -0.057*** -4.97  -0.068*** -5.45  -0.060*** -4.33 
ChgROA  -0.207*** -2.75  -0.158** -2.25  -0.221*** -2.72 
Litigation  -0.000 -0.19  -0.001 -0.44  0.000 0.15 
Ln(Analyst)  0.000 0.21  0.000 0.07  0.001 1.52 
Institution  -0.008 -1.22  -0.006 -1.00  -0.011 -0.79 
Independence  0.003 0.38  -0.003 -0.25  -0.004 -0.44 
Accounting  0.003 0.67  0.002 0.38  0.002 0.31 
Legal  -0.005 -0.58  -0.001 -0.13  -0.005 -0.75 
MF Surprise  -0.919*** -4.13  -0.960*** -4.12  -0.861*** -3.19 
Horizon  -0.000*** -5.15  -0.000*** -5.32  -0.000*** -13.12 
IMR  0.005** 2.38  0.003 1.46  0.004 1.43 
Industry & Year FE      Included       Included       Included  
Adj. R2      0.44 
 
      0.39 
 
      0.43  
Obs.      4,473 
 
      4,473 
 
      4,473  
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Panel B: Complexity    
    Segments 
  Pred.  Coef. t-stats 
Dominant FD   -0.001 -0.15 
Intrapersonal FD   -0.001 -0.41 
Dominant FD  Segments(0,1) +  0.023*** 2.69 
Intrapersonal FD  Segments(0,1) +  0.019** 2.02 
Segments(0,1)   -0.026*** -3.09 
StdRet   -0.564** -2.38 
Dispersion   -0.031*** -4.04 
StdEPS   -0.229** -2.31 
Ln(MV)   -0.004*** -5.34 
Market to Book   0.001*** 4.51 
Loss   -0.058*** -5.43 
ChgROA   -0.206*** -2.67 
Litigation   -0.002 -0.83 
Ln(Analyst)   0.000 0.02 
Institution   -0.009 -1.49 
Independence   -0.007 -0.68 
Accounting   0.003 0.54 
Legal   -0.004 -0.52 
MF Surprise   -0.854*** -3.32 
Horizon   -0.000*** -5.26 
IMR   0.006*** 2.62 
Industry & Year FE             Included   
Adj. R
2
             0.45  
Obs.             4,473 
 Panel A of Table 4 presents the results of OLS regressions to test H3a and H3b concerning the relation 
between TMT functional diversity and management forecast accuracy conditional on earnings uncertainty 
measured by StdRet, Dispersion and StdEPS respectively. Panel B presents the results of OLS regressions 
using organizational complexity as the conditioning factor. All variables are defined as in Appendix B. 
Industry and year fixed effects and an intercept are included but unreported for brevity. Two-way (firm and 
year) cluster-robust standard errors are used to correct for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. t-
statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels (two-sided), respectively.  
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Table 5.TMT Functional Diversity and Management Forecast Accuracy Conditional 
on CEO/CFO Characteristics 
   
 
  CEO  CFO 
 
Pred.  Coef. t-stats  Coef. t-stats 
Dominant FD   0.011* 1.76  0.014* 1.83 
Intrapersonal FD   0.016** 1.99  0.018* 1.91 
Dominant FD  CEO Generalism –  -0.006* -1.94    
Intrapersonal FD  CEO Generalism –  -0.012** -2.09    
CEO Generalism   0.017* 1.86    
Dominant FD  CFO Generalism –     -0.011* -1.75 
Intrapersonal FD  CFO Generalism –     -0.014* -1.68 
CFO Generalism      0.022 1.26 
StdRet   -0.561** -2.38  -0.508** -2.37 
Dispersion   -0.031*** -4.08  -0.031*** -4.19 
StdEPS   -0.224** -2.39  -0.203** -2.21 
Ln(Segments)   -0.003** -1.99  -0.003** -2.31 
Ln(MV)   -0.004*** -4.79  -0.004*** -4.53 
Market to Book   0.001*** 4.40  0.001*** 4.83 
Loss   -0.058*** -5.31  -0.060*** -5.63 
ChgROA   -0.204*** -2.65  -0.204*** -2.70 
Litigation   -0.003 -0.80  -0.000 -0.04 
Ln(Analyst)   -0.000 -0.14  0.000 0.21 
Institution   -0.011 -0.93  -0.008 -1.62 
Independence   -0.005 -0.47  -0.006 -0.61 
Accounting   0.002 0.43  0.002 0.41 
Legal   -0.001 -0.13  -0.004 -0.40 
MF Surprise   -0.865*** -3.42  -0.877*** -3.46 
Horizon   -0.000*** -5.54  -0.000*** -5.52 
IMR   0.005** 2.11  0.005*** 2.63 
Industry & Year FE         Included          Included   
Adj. R
2
         0.45         0.44  
Obs.         4,473 
 
       4,473 
 Panel A and B of Table 5 present the results of OLS regressions to test H4a and H4b concerning the 
relation between TMT functional diversity and management forecast accuracy conditional on CEO and 
CFO functional diversity, respectively. All variables are defined as in Appendix B. Industry and year fixed 
effects and an intercept are included but unreported for brevity. Two-way (firm and year) cluster-robust 
standard errors are used to correct for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels (two-sided), 
respectively. 
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Table 6.TMT Functional Diversity and Management Forecast Accuracy 
– Instrumental Variables Approach (2SLS) 
 
  
  (1) 
Dominant FD 
 (2)  
Intrapersonal FD 
 (3)  
MF Accuracy 
  Pred.  Coef. t-stats  Coef. t-stats  Coef. t-stats 
Predicted Dominant FD +  
 
  
 
  0.014* 1.75 
Predicted Intrapersonal FD +  
 
  
 
  0.015** 2.02 
Prior Dominant FD   0.641*** 29.53  0.015 1.52  
 
 
Prior Intrapersonal FD   0.031* 1.83  0.779*** 59.45  
 
 
Prior ROE   -0.009** -2.16  -0.015** -2.07  
 
 
StdRet   -0.491 -1.13  0.065 0.68  -0.394 -1.60 
Dispersion   0.007 0.70  0.008 1.17  -0.028*** -4.02 
StdEPS   0.151** 1.99  -0.018 -0.34  -0.181* -1.82 
Ln(Segments)   0.002 0.43  0.000 0.07  -0.003** -2.24 
Ln(MV)   -0.002 -0.79  0.005*** 3.69  -0.003*** -3.46 
Market to Book   0.001 1.22  0.001*** 3.09  0.001*** 3.69 
Loss   0.003 0.22  0.014 1.39  -0.070*** -5.84 
ChgROA   -0.021 -1.20  -0.020 -1.38  -0.223*** -2.68 
Litigation   -0.002 -0.29  -0.002 -0.39  -0.002 -0.87 
Ln(Analyst)   0.000 0.05  -0.006*** -3.75  -0.002 -1.10 
Institution   0.008 0.47  0.010 1.39  -0.008 -1.44 
Independence   0.027 1.26  0.021 1.30  -0.010 -0.98 
Accounting   -0.038*** -3.83  0.048*** 7.68  0.003 0.69 
Legal   0.146*** 3.35  -0.035 -1.22  -0.005 -0.38 
MF Surprise   -0.040 -0.26  -0.019 -0.20  -0.967*** -3.34 
Horizon   -0.000 -0.87  0.000 0.66  -0.000*** -4.76 
IMR   -0.001 -0.29  0.001 0.43  0.005** 2.36 
Industry & Year FE       Included        Included        Included  
Adj. R
2
   0.44   0.73   0.46  
Obs.        3,420        3,420        3,420  
Angrist-Pischke F-statistic      413.10***      1663.38***    
p-value for Hansen J-statistic             0.27 
Table 6 presents the results of 2SLS regressions to test H1 and H2. All variables are defined as in Appendix B. Industry and year fixed effects and an 
intercept are included but unreported for brevity. Two-way (firm and year) cluster-robust standard errors are used to correct for cross-sectional and time-
series dependence. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels (two-sided), 
respectively. The Angrist-Pischke F-Statistic for weak identification are significant at the 1% level, rejecting the null hypothesis that the instruments 
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weakly identify the model. The p-value for Hansen J statistic is >0.10, suggesting that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms and are 
correctly excluded from the second-stage regressions. 
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Table 7. TMT Functional Diversity and Management Forecast Accuracy Conditional on Firm and CEO/CFO 
Characteristics – Instrumental Variables Approach (2SLS) 
 
Panel A: Uncertainty and Complexity       
 
  (1) StdRet  (2) Dispersion  (3) StdEPS  (4) Segments 
  Pred.  Coef. t-stats  Coef. t-stats  Coef. t-stats  Coef. t-stats 
Predicted Dominant FD   -0.000 -0.01  0.001 0.12  -0.002 -0.30  0.033 1.09 
Predicted Intrapersonal FD   0.007 1.21  -0.006 -1.08  -0.002 -0.36  0.015* 1.80 
Predicted Dominant FD  StdRet(0,1) +  0.029* 1.76          
Predicted Intrapersonal FD  StdRet(0,1) +  0.018* 1.91          
StdRet(0,1)   -0.026** -2.05          
Predicted Dominant FD  Dispersion(0,1) +     0.020** 2.48       
Predicted Intrapersonal FD  Dispersion(0,1) +     0.032*** 3.44       
Dispersion(0,1)      -0.027*** -4.13       
Predicted Dominant FD  StdEPS(0,1) +        0.025* 1.87    
Predicted Intrapersonal FD  StdEPS(0,1) +        0.028*** 3.44    
StdEPS(0,1)         -0.035*** -3.70    
Predicted Dominant FD  Segments(0,1) +           0.036* 1.75 
Predicted Intrapersonal FD  Segments(0,1) +           0.025* 1.78 
Segments(0,1)            -0.028* -1.84 
Controls   Included   Included   Included   Included  
Industry & Year FE   Included 
 
 Included 
 
 Included   Included  
Adj. R
2
   0.46 
 
 0.41 
 
 0.45   0.42  
Obs.   3,420 
 
 3,420 
 
 3,420   3,420  
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Panel B: CEO and CFO Functional Diversity 
 
  CEO  
 
CFO  
 
Pred.  Coef. t-stats 
 
Coef. t-stats 
Predicted Dominant FD   0.025** 2.02 
 
0.041** 2.19 
Predicted Intrapersonal FD   0.026* 1.67 
 
0.032* 1.72 
Predicted Dominant FD  CEO Generalism –  -0.019* -1.64 
 
  
Predicted Intrapersonal FD  CEO Generalism –  -0.018* -1.68 
 
  
CEO Generalism   0.040** 2.03 
 
  
Predicted Dominant FD  CFO Generalism –     -0.024** -2.02 
Predicted Intrapersonal FD  CFO Generalism –     -0.021* -1.85 
CFO Generalism      0.034** 1.97 
Controls   Included   
 
Included 
 Industry & Year FE   Included    Included  
Adj. R
2
   0.45   0.45  
Obs.   3,420 
  
3,420 
 Table 7 presents the results of 2SLS regressions to test H3 and H4 concerning the relation between TMT functional diversity and management forecast 
accuracy conditional on firm (Panel A) and CEO/CFO (Panel B) characteristics, respectively. All variables are defined as in Appendix B. Industry and 
year fixed effects and an intercept are included but unreported for brevity. Two-way (firm and year) cluster-robust standard errors are used to correct for 
cross-sectional and time-series dependence. t-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent 
levels (two-sided), respectively. The first-stage regressions of 2SLS are unreported for brevity. For all first-stage regressions, the Angrist-Pischke F-
Statistic for weak identification are significant at the 1% level, rejecting the null hypothesis that the instruments weakly identify the model. The p-value 
for Hansen J statistic is >0.10 in all cases, suggesting that the instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms and are correctly excluded from the 
second-stage regressions. 
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Table 8. Complements versus Substitutes of the Two Types of  
TMT Functional Diversity 
 
 MF Accuracy 
 Coef. t-stats 
Dominant FD 0.040** 2.38 
Dominant FD  Intrapersonal FD -0.060** -2.13 
Intrapersonal FD 0.041** 2.45 
StdRet -0.277** -2.01 
Dispersion -0.033*** -3.82 
StdEPS -0.276*** -2.64 
Ln(Segments) -0.003*** -3.06 
Ln(MV) -0.003*** -4.45 
Market to Book 0.001*** 4.16 
Loss -0.055*** -4.11 
ChgROA -0.151*** -2.65 
Litigation -0.000 -0.37 
Ln(Analyst) 0.000 0.61 
Institution -0.006 -1.06 
Independence -0.003 -0.28 
Accounting 0.002 0.34 
Legal -0.002 -0.29 
MF Surprise -0.881*** -3.42 
Horizon -0.000*** -3.93 
IMR 0.004*** 2.84 
Industry & Year FE                Included     
Adj. R
2
                0.41  
Obs.                4,473  
Table 8 presents the regression results testing whether the two types of functional diversity are 
complements or substitutes to each other. All variables are defined as in Appendix B. Industry and year 
fixed effects and an intercept are included but unreported for brevity. Two-way (firm and year) cluster-
robust standard errors are used to correct for cross-sectional and time-series dependence. t-statistics are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels (two-
sided), respectively.  
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